Tactical Notes (Brighton)

Shaun Calvert gives an illustrated breakdown of the out-of-possession structures from Ipswich’s draw with Brighton.

Ipswich defending set plays and clearing corners

A majority of teams (including Ipswich) are now more comfortable in defending set-plays in central areas. This is largely due to teams using several zonal defenders to protect the perceived most dangerous areas of the penalty box.

Teams position their best headers of a ball in areas with the highest opposition chance of scoring. Ipswich centre back Jacob Greaves appears to be a ‘magnet to the ball’ when he clears a lot of corners, but in reality he’s being positioned where the ball is most likely to be delivered, that is, in the most dangerous part of the penalty area.

This then means that you potentially allow an aerial advantage or a numerical advantage to the opposition in other parts of the penalty area, but they are still going to have to get the ball past those big zonal guys plus the keeper, to score.

The hybrid zonal and man-marking system that Ipswich (and the majority of other teams) use, means that the perceived ‘least’ aerially effective players are placed in the least dangerous zones (near post, covering the short corner, edge of area, etc.) and not asked to man mark.

Previously for Ipswich, three of these players were commonly Mr. Morsy, Conor Chaplin and Nathan Broadhead but against Brighton it started off as Mr. Morsy, Omari Hutchinson and Sammie Szmodics.

As we have also seen over the last few years, teams increasingly identify defensive set-pieces as a potential time to counter-attack, as attacking teams commit bodies into forward areas and, as is fairly obvious, leave more space at the back to exploit. We also know that this is an area Ipswich have tried to gain an advantage, with the goal away at Derby (18 months ago) being possibly the most striking example.

This was our hybrid set up for that corner, which is similar to how we still set up today (varying slightly according to how the opposition are organised). The result of that corner was a catch by goalkeeper Christian Walton – a throw out wide to Broadhead – a cross field pass to Burns – a header back across to Chaplin. I believe this is a practised ‘zig-zag’ counter attack where the ball is switched against where the defenders are focused and example of ‘pushing against the flow’ of the opposition.

Moving onto the Brighton game. Brighton had a total of 9 corners (2 from their right wing and 7 from the left wing) and they had good variety:

• 2 outswingers

• 5 inswingers

• 2 short corners

They also varied the delivery with near, central and back post options.

Thus Ipswich slightly adjusted their set-up to reflect what Brighton were doing, with a couple more examples in the stills above (check out Mr. Morsy’s ‘open’ body shape so that he has more chance of seeing players coming from all directions in the second image).

With regard to how Ipswich cleared those corners:

• 3 were cleared into central areas, but 2 went to Brighton players and one, luckily, went to Hutchinson (a header by Greaves that mostly went up in the air, rather than away) who mis-controlled it and gave away possession (more on that 2nd phase later).

• Muric caught one and punched one away.

• Two went straight through the box, coming out the other side.

• One landed at Davis’ feet who picked a pass to Hutchinson but the counter attack came to nothing near the half way line.

• Brighton messed up one short corner routine (more on that later too).

Players are coached in the first instance to clear the ball in the most efficient way at set pieces. For example, you do not want to clear it straight to an opponent who is then going to have an opportunity to get a clear effort on goal (as with one Burns header back across goal). It is also better to clear it into area that it is going to be contested quickly by your own team-mates, rather than allowing an opponent time and space to re-cycle the ball back into a dangerous area.

This leads onto the 2nd phase situations, which teams are now looking to exploit. Brentford and Arsenal work particularly hard on these, with excellent results. I believe that the 2nd phase is seen as an area to exploit as this is when the defensive team are less likely to be in their pre-planned, set-piece shape. Players begin to think about if and when they should go back into their base shape (or “rest defence”). For example, when does Davis decide to move back out into the left back position? Players on the defending team also have to decide whether to close the ball down or stay in their zonal and man-marking positions. As such, it becomes more of a ‘chaos’ situation, rather than controlled, with forwards left unmarked and poor defensive lines (think of the recent Man Utd goal at Southampton).  

The best option for avoiding these second phase attacks is to try and direct “clearances” towards a teammate, if you have the time, space and awareness to be able to pick them out, especially if this can lead to a counter attacking opportunity. This is rather than trying to clear to central areas ‘at all costs’, with teams now being more ‘comfortable’ in defending central areas.  

Our two best chances from the Brighton game both resulted from defensive corners. On one occasion Liam Delap hit the post after a long direct run from Ipswich’s penalty area. This came from a second phase play. A poor Brighton cross was followed by a relatively easy, unchallenged, headed clearance from Tuanzebe, sent forward and towards Delap, who was on his way back to his rest defence position but had turned back when the 2nd phase cross came in.

Finally, the Hutchinson counter attacking chance came from a poorly executed short corner routine, where the Brighton player let the ball roll under his foot, with  Hutchinson able to pick it up as he was on his way out to close him down (as was his zonal role at that corner).

George Hirst versus Liam Delap in the Ipswich press (Brighton)

One other nugget from Kieran McKenna in his post-match presser for Brighton:

So, what was the problem in the first half and what did we do differently after the break?

In the first half, we appeared to press in a 4-2-4 but not aggressively or man-for-man. It was Delap’s job to pick-up the Brighton defensive midfielder Carlos Baleba, whilst our Left 10 (Szmodics) worked on their centre backs.

This meant that Brighton could easily work their way up the pitch by having an overload in their back line (especially with Verbruggen joining in and Baleba working in the ‘shadow’ of his marker) and moving the ball across the pitch, waiting for the opening to move into the next phase.  

The change in the second half saw Hutchinson move onto covering Baleba, Szmodics (then Clarke) was moved onto the full back and Burns (then Ogbene) the left back, leaving Delap to cover the two centre backs.

Once Hirst came on for the Delap, we then saw his pressing work better by funnelling Brighton into their left back corner, where they struggled to get out so easily, enabling Ipswich to force errors and turnovers.

The final two stills shows how Brighton tried to overcome this, by Baleba dragging his man (Hutchinson) out of the middle of the pitch, with his midfield partner (Ayari, also working in the ‘shadows’) then dropping into that space to link the play and move them up the pitch.